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Abstract
Just hours before the Army of Northern Virginia raised the white flag at Appomattox Court House,
Confederate Colonel Edward Porter Alexander approached his commanding officer, Robert E. Lee, with what
he hoped was a game-saving plan. Rather than suffer the mortification of surrendering, Alexander begged Lee
to scatter his men across the countryside like “rabbits & partridges” where they could continue waging war,
not as regular Confederate soldiers, but as elusive guerrilla fighters. Lee listened patiently to his subordinate’s
reasoning for irregular warfare. Before Alexander finished, he reminded Lee that the men were utterly devoted
to their commanding general, and that such loyalty would continue to inspire the sacrifice of more blood, even
if it meant taking to the woods and fighting like common outlaws. When Alexander concluded his
impassioned plea, Lee asked his subordinate to imagine what would happen if he turned Alexander’s
suggestion into official policy. But before Alexander had a chance to respond, Lee reminded him that virtually
every Southern community had been overrun by Union armies, that farms were in disarray, and that crops
were ruined. Lee feared that his veterans, upon returning home, would have no choice but to plunder and rob
for survival. It would take no time for his disciplined army to descend into a demoralized mob that would take
the rest of the South into a downward spiral of unending and unrestrained violence. “As for myself,” Lee
concluded, “while you young men might afford to go to bushwhacking, the only proper & dignified course for
me would be to surrender myself & take the consequences of my actions.” [excerpt]
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Just hours before the Army of Northern Virginia raised the white flag at 
Appomattox Court House, Confederate Colonel Edward Porter Alexander 
approached his commanding officer, Robert E. Lee, with what he hoped was 
a game-saving plan. Rather than suffer the mortification of surrendering, 
Alexander begged Lee to scatter his men across the countryside like “rabbits 
& partridges” where they could continue waging war, not as regular Con-
federate soldiers, but as elusive guerrilla fighters. Lee listened patiently to 
his subordinate’s reasoning for irregular warfare. Before Alexander finished, 
he reminded Lee that the men were utterly devoted to their commanding 
general, and that such loyalty would continue to inspire the sacrifice of more 
blood, even if it meant taking to the woods and fighting like common outlaws. 
When Alexander concluded his impassioned plea, Lee asked his subordinate 
to imagine what would happen if he turned Alexander’s suggestion into of-
ficial policy. But before Alexander had a chance to respond, Lee reminded 
him that virtually every Southern community had been overrun by Union 
armies, that farms were in disarray, and that crops were ruined. Lee feared 
that his veterans, upon returning home, would have no choice but to plun-
der and rob for survival. It would take no time for his disciplined army to 
descend into a demoralized mob that would take the rest of the South into 
a downward spiral of unending and unrestrained violence. “As for myself,” 
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Lee concluded, “while you young men might afford to go to bushwhacking, 
the only proper & dignified course for me would be to surrender myself & 
take the consequences of my actions.”1
Imbedded in this exchange are some of the most contested interpretive 
points in the field of Civil War history: Did the Confederacy possess suf-
ficient nationalism in its quest for independence? What did Lee symbolize 
to the South? Was Confederate strategy doomed to failure, since its military 
and political leaders were largely committed to conventional fighting with 
professional armies? How did military operations affect the Southern home 
front? And what enabled the Southern soldier to continue the fight long past 
the point when final military success seemed realistic to those outside the 
army? These questions crisscross two extraordinarily important books on the 
Confederate experience—Joseph Glatthaar’s General Lee’s Army and Daniel 
Sutherland’s A Savage Conflict. Barton Myers’ Executing Daniel Bright is micro-
history at its finest, for it too engages these big questions of Civil War histo-
riography in a focused study of a local guerrilla conflict in North Carolina’s 
Great Dismal Swamp region. Although the authors look at radically different 
forms of warfare—one fought by a regular army and the other waged by 
partisan forces—their work signifies an important turning point in Civil War 
scholarship, for they have taken the methodology of social history as far as 
it can be taken to pursue these lines of inquiry. For more than twenty years, 
the contours of the field have been broadly outlined by questions into the 
common experience of both civilians and soldiers, the relationship between 
the battlefield and the home front, how political loyalties were created and 
contested, and why the North won and the South lost. These questions, for 
the most part, have been and continue to be pursued primarily from a social 
history perspective. The results have been extraordinary, especially in showing 
how people of different social groups occupied the same historical space but 
made very different meanings of their experiences. We possess a kaleidoscope 
of patterns of a Northern and Southern society at war, always shifting, always 
looking different, and always variegated, depending on how the historian 
reflects the relationships of a particular place and people between the two 
glass planes of the military and the home front. 
Despite the rich and diverse outpouring of Civil War books, nonspecialists 
continue to parrot the academic party line that Civil War history is preoccu-
pied with locating regimental flanks, obsessed with battlefield heroics, and 
infatuated with the most obscure and irrelevant tactical minutia. It is hard 
to imagine a greater distortion of the state of the field. Civil War scholars 
since the late 1980s have embraced the philosophical approach of social his-
tory, answering the call of Maris A. Vinovskis in his now-famous Journal of 
American History article, “Have Social Historians Lost the Civil War?” Not 
only did social historians find Civil War history, they have devoured it. Glat-
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thaar, Sutherland, and Barton are products of this intellectual tradition. They 
exemplify new military history, which, like new social history, is not so new 
anymore. Their reliance on social history methodology gets the reader to the 
ground level of military operations, where they show how ordinary people, 
stuck in the muck of daily life, tried to make meaning of a vast and terrible 
conflict. Their analysis of what soldiers were thinking and how they were 
motivated to commit certain political acts follows a historiographical trajectory 
established by Gerald Linderman, James McPherson, and Reid Mitchell, all 
of whom made distinct contributions to the study of what the rank-and-file 
thought. While Glatthaar, Barton, and Sutherland reinforce our fundamental 
understanding of soldier motivation, they are more successful than previous 
scholars in explaining how Civil War soldiers—whether they were guerrillas 
terrorizing the Missouri countryside or Lee’s soldiers charging at Chancel-
lorsville—could act with incredible political solidarity at one moment and in 
the next instance they could turn against their government, the people back 
home, and each other. 
General Lee’s Army is a masterpiece of historical scholarship. It is incon-
ceivable that anyone will ever write again about Lee’s army with the same 
analytical complexity of Glatthaar, for his findings draw from a staggering 
array of archival material that has never seen the soft lights of a reading room. 
Such a claim might seem hyperbolic, but anyone who looks at Glatthaar’s 
bibliography will find more than twenty pages of cited manuscript collections. 
The massive empirical foundation of General Lee’s Army sustains Glatthaar’s 
insightful statistical analysis of the Army of Northern Virginia, which enables 
him to conclusively demonstrate that slavery infused the lives of ordinary 
soldiers, that military service never resembled a rich man’s war and a poor 
man’s fight, that desertion cut across social-economic lines, that Lee’s officers 
gave themselves physically to the cause, and that the vast majority of Lee’s 
veterans were deeply committed to the cause. While these conclusions are 
hardly new, they are conveyed with such power and persuasiveness that the 
publication of General Lee’s Army feels like final judgment on some of the most 
contested debates in Civil War historiography. 
 Glatthaar has written a smooth but analytically gripping narrative, far 
exceeding the intellectual complexity of Douglas Southall Freeman’s enduring 
Lee’s Lieutenants: A Study in Command (1942). He accomplishes this by recon-
structing the multiple ways that the Confederate high command, Richmond 
authorities, Southern civilians, slaves, and those serving in the rank-and-file 
engaged one another. No one is studied in isolation. Unlike Freeman, whose 
traditional narrative intertwined military campaigns with mini-biographies of 
Lee’s most prominent officers, Glatthaar structures his book around how the 
Army of Northern Virginia functioned on a daily basis. It is his sensitivity to the 
details of operation—whether it be the election of officers, the implementation 
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of conscription, or the running of administrative departments—that gives us 
new angles to look at familiar subjects such as enlistment patterns, the ordeal 
of combat, civilian-military relations, problems of discipline, religious matters, 
and the role of Confederate slaves. Rarely are questions of power and authority 
removed from his discussions of the army’s organization and management. 
When officers ran for election in the wake of the 1862 Conscription Act, for 
instance, Glatthaar discovered how power largely flowed from the bottom up 
in Confederate regiments. Once members of the rank-and-file were given the 
opportunity to have a say in who would rule over them, they cleaned house 
of officers who were deemed incompetent in camp or cowardly in battle. 
Some good men lost their commission to be sure, but Glatthaar’s research 
demonstrates that the election system gave promising soldiers a chance to 
rise in rank. Throughout the book, Glatthaar recovers how soldiers existed in 
a range of overlapping networks that could, at one moment, push a man to 
join comrades in disobeying military authority while, in another instance, he 
might feel compelled to join his buddies in a doomed assault. 
Glatthaar suggests that the great paradox behind the Army of Northern 
Virginia’s military prowess lies in the relentless desire of every soldier to have 
independence in the ranks. Their inflated sense of individualism weakened 
discipline, especially in camp; but when officers were able to channel this fiery 
spirit of independence into an assertion of manly behavior on the battlefield, 
Glatthaar believes that Lee’s rank-and-file coalesced into a unified fighting 
force that had no equal during the war. Careless readers might misconstrue 
the author’s argument as a modern spin on the Lost Cause tale of Confeder-
ate invincibility. In no way does this book romanticize the experience of Lee’s 
veterans. Glatthaar tells a range of individual stories, including those of men 
who did not live up to accepted standards of courage, who found themselves 
punished by comrades for failing to face enemy fire, and who returned home 
with the stigma of cowardice. In fact, Glatthaar is unmistakably clear about 
the role of coercion as a decisive factor in forging unit solidarity, though at 
the same time he acknowledges that a powerful esprit de corps took hold of 
Lee’s men, inspiring them to make amazing physical sacrifices. By the end of 
the war, Lee’s veterans were living on a diet that lacked the caloric substance 
to sustain muscle and body mass. They were literally starving in the trenches 
of Petersburg in the months preceding Appomattox. 
 Explaining what kept the Army of Northern Virginia together leads Glat-
thaar into the murky world of group consciousnesses. This might be the least 
satisfying section of General Lee’s Army, for Glatthaar uses the concept of cul-
ture in a highly nebulous way. It comes to represent the center of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, explaining a range of behaviors from recognition of military 
authority to soldier dissent; but Glatthaar never gives culture a concrete func-
tion so that we can understand the distinct ways of seeing and feeling in the 
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ranks. Culture, in General Lee’s Army, is largely an invisible force that permeates 
thought and controls behavior. Glatthaar rounds up the usual suspects when 
defining manly culture in the South—beholden to honor, eager to use physical 
aggression, a craving for independence—and he believes this cultural baggage 
from the civilian world was too much of a burden for professional armies to 
carry. The author is correct that the transition to military life was difficult for 
men accustomed to having mastery over their own households. Yet, the fact 
remains that Union armies contended with the same problems of discipline 
that ensnarled Confederate forces. Neither Northerners nor Southerners were 
disposed to accept orders from a military regime, especially from men whom 
they knew as social intimates in the civilian world. Thus the cultural exception-
alism of the South appears less exceptional. The analytical softness of culture 
in General Lee’s Army, moreover, obscures what Glatthaar does better than any 
of his predecessors who have written about the Civil War soldier experience. 
He shows how the clash between the authoritarian nature of military life and 
the irrepressible desire for survival pushed soldiers to challenge authority, 
not as some cultural reflex, but because they were caught in a web of practi-
cal and political demands in trying to meet the needs of home, community, 
the army, and the national government. To be sure, Glatthaar’s reliance on 
culture does not take away from his impressive strengths as a social historian. 
He is at his best when focusing on the intersection between material reality 
and ideas to explain how Lee’s veterans coped with the stress of living away 
from home while confronting the everyday threat of psychological ruin and 
physical annihilation.
The terror of war was not confined to the battlefields of conventional armies 
but spilled into the countryside, where civilians, runaway slaves, Unionists, 
partisan rangers, bands of deserters, and common criminals engaged in some of 
the most ruthless fighting of the Civil War. Both Sutherland and Myers capture 
the chaos of the Confederate home front without engaging the impoverished 
scholarly debate about whether the Civil War foreshadowed twentieth-century 
warfare of total destruction. They pursue more fruitful lines of inquiry that 
examine how guerrilla warfare influenced Union and Confederate military 
strategy, how it shaped the experience of the home front, how it figured into 
the process of emancipation, and how it forced Southerners to subordinate 
political loyalties to the immediate reality of who wielded power in their 
communities. On both sides, professional military men attempted to harness 
the violent excesses of guerrilla warfare to advance national strategy, but they 
had little success, as policymakers could not control local populations in the 
countryside or in remote regions without large bodies of troops. As soon as 
portions of the Confederacy fell into Union hands or were simply abandoned 
by Southern forces, guerrilla bands materialized—in most states this was as 
early as 1861. Sutherland is the first scholar to demonstrate that the Southern 
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people were not conflicted by the prospect of guerrilla warfare. In fact, they 
immediately pressed Southern officials to organize partisan troops, a demand 
that took on more urgency in the wake of the Conscription Act of 1862, when 
scores of able-bodied men were shipped into Confederate armies, leaving com-
munities feeling more exposed to enemy invasion and more vulnerable to the 
breakdown of law and order. The guerrilla bands shielded communities and 
disrupted the operations of Union armies; but they also became increasingly 
ungovernable as the war progressed, their unrestrained tactics intensifying 
a Union hard-war policy that devastated Southern civilians, many of whom 
wished that they had never looked to men like partisans John Morgan and 
John Mosby as liberators. 
Like no other book on the Confederate experience, Sutherland’s A Savage 
Conflict shows how guerrilla warfare destabilized the entire Southern home 
front—not just Missouri, Kansas, and East Tennessee, where murderous 
bushwhackers roamed in large numbers. In so doing, he reconfigures how we 
conceptualize the relationship between the military and Confederate civilians. 
No longer can we assume that Southern morale hinged upon the success or 
failure of great armies. No longer can we isolate civilians from the physical 
and emotional terror of war, even if they were removed from the direct path 
of major armies. And no longer can we frame the perspective of a people at 
war around abstract questions of political loyalty or Confederate identity. 
Throughout Sutherland’s richly detailed narrative, he reminds us that most 
white Southerners, whether dealing with Union or Confederate guerrillas, 
were not inclined to take a certain course of action because they had a strong 
or weak sense of Confederate identity. They acted in a highly spontaneous 
way, depending on the ever-changing conditions on the ground and on who 
was holding the gun barrel. 
Sutherland excels in revealing how Southerners trapped in an isolated 
region of the Confederacy preferred the protection of local defense troops, 
even if that meant sacrificing the priorities of the national government in 
Richmond. Thankfully, he does not frame this important conclusion within 
the debate over whether the Confederacy possessed sufficient nationalism 
or not. Neither does Myers in Executing Daniel Bright, a focused community 
study that surpasses Phillip Shaw Paludan’s classic Victims (1981) in analytical 
sophistication, making it one of the finest books we have on localized guerrilla 
warfare and one that would be a terrific fit for an undergraduate classroom or 
graduate seminar. Just as Sutherland found common outlaws, deserters, and 
other misfits joining the guerrilla ranks after 1862, Myers also detected taking 
to the woods a range of people whose motivations ranged from slave control, 
resistance to Confederate conscription, and defense against the Union army. 
With the Emancipation Proclamation, the war turned savage near Elizabeth-
town, North Carolina, and a bloody cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation 
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spurred atrocities on both sides. Barton shows how questions of power in-
spired horrific acts of killing and physical destruction. He wisely rejects the 
universal and unsatisfying explanation that violence begets more violence. 
Everyone knew that their very existence was at stake with the collapse of 
slavery, the issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation, and the employment 
of black troops. Barton shows how difficult it was for Federal authorities to 
determine political allegiance in rebel-controlled areas, since the people there 
were perfect chameleons in the ways they revealed their loyalties. This is a 
critical finding, for it helps explain why the Union military escalated the war 
against Southern civilians throughout the Confederacy. 
The policy of extermination in North Carolina and elsewhere in the South 
did not result in significant civilian casualties, but the rise of a savage war 
had a powerful impact in changing political behavior. In the most surprising 
finding in Executing Daniel Bright, Barton discovered that leaders of both the 
Confederate guerrillas and the Unionists near Elizabethtown were so weary 
of Federal military operations that they sometimes actually joined forces to 
promote peace, protect property, and preserve social stability. Whether this 
happened in other regions of the Confederacy remains to be seen, but Barton 
concurs with Sutherland that when we destabilize the Southern home front by 
acknowledging the ubiquitous presence of irregular warfare, we find that most 
white people possessed a more fluid and contradictory conception of loyalty 
than scholars of Confederate identity have long suggested. Barton’s study is 
especially effective in showing how the traditional framework of nationalism 
and Confederate identity does not often address how ordinary people crafted 
everyday strategies of survival in a revolutionary war that often demanded 
pragmatism more than idealism. 
How ordinary people come together to engage in collective political action is 
a shared line of inquiry that Glatthaar, Sutherland, and Myers all handle with 
remarkable skill. They refuse to invoke the timeless, placeless, and essential-
ist language of identity as an explanation of group solidarity. Their success 
in revealing general patterns of behavior through a bottom-up approach of 
individual stories exemplifies the power of micro-history. Yet, all three books 
expose the methodological barrier confronting Civil War historians who, for 
the most part, are firmly entrenched behind the bunkers of social history. The 
goal of recovering the historical reality of past persons and how they made 
meaning of their lives through the lenses of race, class, and gender is the modus 
operandi of most Civil War historians and academic scholars. 
Sutherland, Glatthaar, and Myers are masters of this hybrid methodology 
of social and cultural history. Their books represent the best of this well-
established and fruitful approach, perfectly positioning us to think about 
the next step so we can ask fresh questions about the soldier experience. 
We are in need of a new way, one that digs below the meaning of language 
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and behavior to explore how people thought and not just what they thought. 
This would not only explain what they did during their military service---
destroy, kill, desert, disobey, and act dutifully—but how they decided or were 
disposed to commit such actions and why. If we complicate social history’s 
emphasis on recovering historical reality through a materialist approach, we 
might gain even deeper access to the very thought processes of soldiers who 
endured an ontological crisis of epic proportions while trying to survive an 
incomprehensible violent Civil War. 
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